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Some argue that the need for reconciliation to override justice particularly applies in civil
wars. Within the ICFY, all draft peace settlements and countless bilateral and trilateral statements
signed by the parties have included a condemnation of ethnic cleansing and a declaration that
any documentation signed under duress is null and void. This author believes that demonstrating
to the world again that there are international laws governing individual conduct during war will
contribute to the process of reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia and send a wider message to
the world as a whole. This is the reconciliation process.
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The United Nations Protection Force for the former Yugo-
slavia ("UNPROFOR" or "Force") was established by Security
Council Resolution 7431 of February 21, 1992. UNPROFOR's
deployment was initially confined to the Republic of Croatia and
only later extended to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ("FYROM").
UNPROFOR also maintained a small presence in the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for liaison pur-
poses. At the height of its deployment, UNPROFOR2 was the
largest, most complex, and most expensive peace-keeping opera-
tion in the United Nations' history. Its personnel, both military
and civilian, numbered some 45,000, and its annual budget was
close to US$2 billion, equivalent to one and a half times the
amount of the U.N. regular budget.
Since its inception, UNPROFOR has faced an extraordinary
amount of international criticism over its role in Bosnia. Much
of the criticism has arisen from unrealistic expectations over
what a U.N. peace-keeping mission can and cannot achieve in
the context of ongoing hostilities or from an insufficient knowl-
edge of UNPROFOR's mandate and hence what it was legally
constituted to achieve. A U.N. peace-keeping mission, through
its deployment, can generally provide relative tranquility and sta-
bility in a country torn apart by war. Through an impartial pres-
ence and inter-positioning, it can also serve as an essential chan-
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uary 1, 1994 to November 1, 1995. Before that, he was the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General to Cambodia. The views expressed in this Essay are the Author's, and
do not in any way represent the official position of the United Nations.
1. S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 3055th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (1992).
2. In March 1995, UNPROFOR was divided into three separate peace-keeping op-
erations: the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia ("UN-
CRO"); UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the United Nations Preventive
Deployment Force ("UNPREDEP"), in FYROM. A Joint theater headquarters, the
United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters, is retained in Zagreb, Croatia.
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nel of communication between conflicting sides, facilitating dia-
logue and cooperation in certain limited areas of mutual
interest. For peace-keeping operations to be successful, they
must be based on the consent and cooperation of the parties in
conflict. Consent and cooperation will be forthcoming only if
the United Nations remains impartial in its dealings with all par-
ties. A U.N. peace-keeping operation cannot, it should be clear,
impose solutions onto unwilling parties, whatever the pressures
to take sides on legal, moral, or political grounds. Furthermore,
A U.N. peace-keeping operation will face serious constraints on
what it is able to achieve if it takes place in an area where the
interests of Security Council members, more particularly its per-
manent members, are engaged and when there is not a consen-
sus among those members on which policy the United Nations
should pursue. Such was the case with UNPROFOR mission in
the former Yugoslavia.
These basic truths are often underestimated in analyses of
the United Nations' peace-keeping role in the former Yugosla-
via. The Bosnian Government, recognized as the legitimate gov-
ernment of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the United Nations, has
expected to be treated as more than equal to their adversaries,
namely the Bosnian Serbs.3 The Bosnian Government has
sought, on political and moral grounds, to obtain a larger in-
volvement of the international community in achieving its aims.
The general public, for its part, horrified by gruesome media
images of the suffering in Bosnia, expected UNPROFOR to pros-
ecute a war against the Bosnian Serbs on behalf of the Bosnian
people.
As a result of the misconceptions and sometimes deliberate
misrepresentations of UNPROFOR's peace-keeping role, heated
debate has arisen about the moral responsibility of UNPROFOR
to end the war in Bosnia. This debate has focused on the use of
force, over and above that required for the self-defense of a
peace-keeping operation. The arguments for and against the
use of force, in pursuit or as a part of a mandate, were in a large
part fuelled by the creation, and subsequent failure, of the U.N.
3. In the context of this Essay, the term "Bosnian Serb" is used to describe Bosnian
Serb authorities and people, living in areas under the control of the Bosnian Serb army,
who support an independent Bosnian Serb state. The term does not include those
Bosnian Serbs living under the authority of the Bosnian Government who support an
integral and unified Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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"safe areas" concept. 4
The policy decision to declare certain places as "safe areas"
was taken in April 1993, when the Bosnian Serb forces, in a swift
and brutal campaign, took large tracts of territory in eastern Bos-
nia. The dire humanitarian crisis that arose from this campaign,
shown graphically in Srebrenica, appalled the international com-
munity. In response, on April 16, 1993, the Security Council,
acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter 5 adopted Resolu-
tion 819,6 which demanded that all parties treat Srebrenica and
its surroundings as a safe area, free from any armed attack or any
other hostile act. In May 1993, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 824,1 extending the concept of safe areas to include
Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, and their surroundings.
In its controversial Resolution 836,8 the Security Council, on
June 4, 1993, again acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Char-
ter, further expanded the mandate of UNPROFOR in order to
enable it to, inter alia, deter attacks against the safe areas, moni-
tor the cease-fire within the safe areas, and promote the with-
drawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the
Bosnian Government.
The adoption of Resolution 836 was a reaction to a crisis
and designed, in theory, to prevent further outbreaks of ethnic
cleansing and bombardments of civilians in these selected areas.
The mandate, however, assigned to UNPROFOR by Resolution
836 brought the Force into an uncomfortable "no-man's land"
between peace-keeping and peace-enforcement. Prior to the
adoption of Resolution 836, UNPROFOR's senior political and
military leadership warned that the failure to impose even mini-
mal controls on the military or paramilitary units of the Bosnian
Government within safe areas would inevitably lead to these ar-
eas being used as havens where forces could refit, re-arm, train,
and prepare for future military operations. The areas would, in
short, consist of armed communities, inside an UNPROFOR-de-
fended perimeter, under the protection of U.N. forces. This
would clearly undermine the integrity of a peaceful and secure
4. See S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 3228th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (1993) (creat-
ing "safe areas").
5. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51.
6. S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 3199th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/819 (1993).
7. S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 3208th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/824 (1993).
8. S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 3228th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (1993).
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safe area, designed to provide a safe haven for civilians. The un-
intended UNPROFOR-Bosnian Government military alliance
that would arise, and in which the two parties would have dispa-
rate aims, would also pose a continuous threat to UNPROFOR.
It would emphasize the close links between the protectors and
the protected, alienating UNPROFOR from other factions
within Bosnia.
Resolution 836 required UNPROFOR to deter attacks on
the safe areas with the use of force, to promote the withdrawal of
non-Government forces from the area, and to safeguard the de-
livery of humanitarian aid. The Security Council's decision to
impose those requirements on UNPROFOR was made without
sufficient consideration of the existing mandates or capabilities
of UNPROFOR throughout its mission area and removed the
semblance of impartiality from the Force. Resolution 836 unin-
tentionally signaled a higher U.N. priority to protect Bosnian
communities than to defend, for example, the Serb minorities in
the U.N. Protected Areas in Croatia. Such a political signal
could, UNPROFOR's leadership cautioned, encourage a Croa-
tian offensive against the Krajina, with attendant risks for UN-
PROFOR troops in the area. It could also signal to the Bosnian
Serbs that UNPROFOR had become an "enemy" in their war.
The ambiguity that has plagued UNPROFOR's mandate fol-
lowing the adoption of Resolution 836 is largely a result of Secur-
ity Council members' difficulty in assessing the long-term opera-
tional considerations and consequences that the safe areas man-
date will have on UNPROFOR operations, as a whole.
Consequently, under pressure of a political imperative to be
seen to "do something," the Security Council entrusted UN-
PROFOR with a mandate that it knew, or should have known,
was not only unrealistic, but impossible to implement. That the
creation of the safe areas was a "quick fix" response to an imme-
diate problem was evident in the Security Council's hesitation to
provide UNPROFOR with the necessary resources to implement
its mandate. The Secretary-General, in his report to the Council
on the implementation of the safe areas mandate, clearly indi-
cated that 34,000 additional forces would be required in order to
ensure full respect for the safe area concept.9 Even under this
9. Report of the Secretay-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 836, U.N. Secre-
tary-General, at 3, U.N. Doc S/25939 (1993).
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"strong" option, which could have addressed the intent of Reso-
lution 836, UNPROFOR would only have possessed the muscle
to forcefully deter attacks on, and not to defend, these areas. It
was assumed, therefore, that some measure of cooperation from
the parties would be required.
Under the "light" option alternative put forward by the Sec-
retary-General, only 7600 additional forces were required. The
objective of this option, however, was limited: to provide a basic
level of deterrence based on the consent and the cooperation of
the parties. This latter option, approved by the Security Council,
was selected with the clear understanding that UNPROFOR
would be incapable of defending the safe areas. It further as-
sumed that, in order for UNPROFOR to implement its mandate
in the safe areas, persuasion and cooperation, rather than force,
would need to be employed. Notwithstanding these assumptions
and limitations, UNPROFOR was not provided with the mini-
mum troop resources to implement its mandate. Thus, the
Force was faced with a peculiar situation: on the one hand,
there was a strongly stated commitment by the Security Council
to protect the civilian populations in the safe areas, while on the
other hand, none of the Security Council members, including
those most supportive of the creation of the safe areas mandate
and some of whom already had troops within UNPROFOR, were
willing or able to provide the resources necessary to carry out the
mandate.
For failing to make a clear distinction in Resolution 836 be-
tween what UNPROFOR was authorized to do and what it was
obliged to do, the Security Council may, in some respects, have
contributed to the warring parties' failure to understand, or fully
respect, the safe area concept. The Security Council may also be
held partly responsible for the subsequent misconceptions that
have arisen over the extent of the use of force UNPROFOR was
entitled to employ in implementing its mandates. The illusion
that UNPROFOR could enforce the safe areas mandate through
the use of force, particularly through the sole use of NATO air
power as an additional tool for accomplishing its tasks, obscured
the very real resource availability and deployment constraints
that would restrict its use. It also undermined one of the impor-
tant components of UNPROFOR's moral strength: UNPROFOR
posed no threat to any of the parties because it was a lightly
armed peace-keeping force, equipped to use force only in self-
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defense. On the other hand, the inability of the Force to use
force was perceived as weakness and undermined UNPROFOR's
credibility with the parties. Attempts to counter UNPROFOR's
lack of credibility in the eyes of the parties by authorizing even
more forceful measures only compounded the problem.
The Security Council resolutions' ambiguous and contradic-
tory messages regarding the safe areas have allowed room for
different interpretations of UNPROFOR's mandate. As a result
of the mandate's uncertain nature, and by extension, the uncer-
tain character of the Force, UNPROFOR has been left open to
criticism for whatever course of action it employs. Consequently,
the public perception of UNPROFOR has been that of a crisis-
reactive mission lurching from one predicament to another.
This perception has, in turn, resulted in a focus on UN-
PROFOR's "failure" to forcefully resolve the crisis rather than in
a better understanding of the reasons as to why it has not been
able to employ force.
The Security Council's marked reluctance to clearly state
whether or not UNPROFOR is a peace-keeping or peace-en-
forcement operation becomes evident when one examines the
many tasks mandated to the Force. The Security Council has, on
occasion, cited Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter when mandating
UNPROFOR to carry out certain tasks without clearly distin-
guishing between a rhetorical or operational application of its
provisions. In many cases, Chapter VII has been cited in Security
Council Resolutions with the caveat "acting in self-defense,"
which is a right inherent to any peace-keeping operation regard-
less of Resolution wording. This routine combination of Chap-
ter VII and the "authorization" of the use of force in self-defense
has further compounded the degree of confusion, even among
knowledgeable observers, over the conditions in which force can
be used by UNPROFOR.The Council resolutions' imprecision in defining the role of
UNPROFOR reflects the lack of consensus among Security
Council members on the complex underlying causes of the con-
flict and on a strategy to resolve it. In the absence of a coherent
or sustained policy by the Security Council, and in particular its
permanent members, there has been a tendency to interpret the
causes of the Yugoslav conflict in purely military terms. The
threat of the use of force has, therefore, been employed as a
measure to contain the conflict or as a means to "even the
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score." Due to the neglect or underestimation of the real con-
cerns of the warring parties, the use of force has become a substi-
tute for a common strategic vision of what the international
community wants to achieve in the former Yugoslavia.
It can also be argued that the focus on whether UN-
PROFOR should use force in Bosnia has been the result of an
attempt to deflect attention from the ineffectiveness of interna-
tional efforts to resolve the conflict. This outrage threatens the
prestige and credibility of all the institutions and governments
involved in the search for a solution. Consequently, some have
argued that in the calculations of national governments and in-
ternational security organizations on whether to seek a military
solution to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the issue has
been seen more in terms of their own credibility than how best
to end the bloodshed and resolve the conflict. The United Na-
tions, in such circumstances, has been a convenient scapegoat
for international inaction.
The policy vacuum that existed throughout the Yugoslav
conflict affected the attitude of the parties on the ground. With
no incentive to cooperate, the parties continued to pursue their
maximalist goals and consistently failed to honor the commit-
ments they made. At the same time, their relations with UN-
PROFOR were determined by their perception of its role. The
Bosnian Government, bitterly disappointed at UNPROFOR's re-
luctance to liberally interpret even the very limited degree of
force at its disposal, has resisted the Force's constraints on its
behavior. The Bosnian Serbs, for their part, have perceived the
use of any force by UNPROFOR as proof that the United Na-
tions had joined sides with their enemy. Consequently, they
have viewed UNPROFOR as a party to the war and, as such, have
repeatedly obstructed and targeted its personnel.
In analyzing the role of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, it is impor-
tant to recall that the Force was not intended to furnish a mili-
tary obstacle to the aims of the belligerent parties. UN-
PROFOR's presence is intended to act as a restraining factor on
all sides, to alleviate the consequences of the war on the civilian
populations, and to provide a measure of stability and security to
besieged populations while an overall political settlement is pur-
sued. Although UNPROFOR remains fundamentally a peace-
keeping mission, the elements of peace-enforcement in its man-
date cannot be ignored. The failure of the safe areas concept
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and the debate over the-use of force demonstrate that these two
elements do not mix well together. There is, as yet, no conclu-
sive evidence that the use of force alone has had a direct or con-
sistently deterrent effect on the warring parties. Serb response
to the use of force has been influenced by various factors and by
the specific circumstances prevailing at the time.
In the case of the safe areas, the threat and use of force has
been effective in some instances and less effective or even
counter-productive in others. For example, in early February
1994, in Sarajevo, the "air strike ultimatum" threat was effective
in ensuring Serb compliance with UNPROFOR's demands. In
the Gorazde crisis in April of the same year, however, close air
support missions by NATO, carried out in defense of UN-
PROFOR personnel, did not halt the Bosnia Serb advance on
the safe area. It was intense shuttle diplomacy by the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General between the Bosnian
Serbs in Pale and President Milosevic in Belgrade, in combina-
tion with NATO's threat of the use of force, that brought about a
resolution to the crisis. In September 1995, the use of massive
air strikes succeeded in gaining Bosnian Serb compliance with
U.N. ultimatums concerning the'status of Sarajevo. At the same
time, in all these situations, it is not clear whether it was the
threat or use of force, associated diplomatic efforts, or other fac-
tors that ensured Serb compliance. For example, in NATO's
most recent air strike campaign,1" Serb defiance was evident up
to the point when the Federation forces'' offensive in western
Bosnia began to advance and Bosnian Serb military commanders
appeared unable to coordinate a response due to the destruc-
tion of their communications.
The "carrot and stick" approach has been utilized in most
cases when force has been employed. For example, it could be
argued that the Sarajevo ultimatum of February 1994 was effec-
tive because the Serbs were simultaneously offered a diplomatic
carrot - the deployment of Russian peace-keepers in Sarajevo,
who the Serb's perceived as being pro-Serb. Additionally, UN-
10. See Elaine Sciolino, NATO Raids Against Serbs Are Increased, N.Y. TiM.S, Sept. 8,
1995, at A14 (describing NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serbs).
11. See Roger Cohen, Conflict in the Balkans: The Croats: Croatia Expands Its Power in
Bosnia, N.Y. TiMS, Sept. 16, 1995, at A4 (describing strength of Muslim-Croat Federa-
tion).
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PROFOR, in negotiations with the parties, succeeded in achiev-
ing a compromise solution acceptable to all sides.
What is clear in all these cases is that the use of force by a
U.N. peace-keeping operation alone cannot end a war, nor can
it provide the basis for resolving the underlying causes of a con-
flict. For the use of force by the United Nations, acting alone or
in concert with a regional organization or with member states, to
be effective, should be determined by and be part of a clear
political policy. That policy should be directed towards peace.
For peace to be sustainable, much more is required than mere
forceful subjugation or military intervention.
UNPROFOR's experience in Bosnia, particularly in the safe
areas, provides a cautionary lesson on the limits of the use of
force when sustained political will to back such force, and a will-
ingness to accept the responsibilities and consequences arising
from such action, do not exist. It also proves that without clear
objectives, a coherent overall policy, and adequate and appropri-
ate resources, a policy of enforcement will be neither effective
nor credible. Finally, it raises the question of whether the
United Nations is the right organization to carry out enforce-
ment action and whether such action can be carried out within a
peace-keeping mandate. Recent experience has shown that the
international community and the United Nations have yet to for-
mulate a feasible concept for the use of force other than in self-
defense under Chapter VII2 peace-keeping operations. The
question that then must be posed is: should a Chapter VI opera-
tion be allowed to develop into a Chapter VII operation or have
elements of enforcement in its mandate?
While the question of whether or not Chapter VI peace-
keeping missions should be allowed to stray into Chapter VII
peace-enforcement operations is extremely important, it is
equally necessary to focus on whether a peace-keeping mission
should be deployed to an area where a war is continuing and
there is, as of yet, no peace to keep. In the absence of the will of
the parties in conflict to reach an agreement, and in the absence
of a unified approach to resolve a crisis by key external players,
the morally difficult but practical decision to shy away from any
assistance other than purely humanitarian may have to be made.
If, nonetheless, a decision to intervene is made, then it is impera-
12. U.N. CHARTER arts. 33-38.
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tive that the parameters of that intervention be clearly defined
and understood by all parties before a peace-keeping or peace-
enforcement operation is deployed. In this regard, it would be
useful if, when formulating mandates for peace-keeping or
peace-enforcement operations, senior U.N. civilian and military
officials are more actively involved in order to ensure clearer and
more realistic objectives for a force.
There is also a need to carefully formulate criteria for deter-
mining the character of an operation. In today's highly charged
and subjective ethnic and nationalist conflicts, the use of con-
sent of the parties as the sole yardstick for the nature of a force
may be too restrictive. As evidenced by UNPROFOR's experi-
ence, the dynamics of ethno-nationalist conflicts widely differ
from those for which the traditional concepts of peace-keeping
were crafted. Thus, an impartial role in such conflicts can unin-
tentionally freeze an existing balance of power, or encourage the
stronger side to take advantage of its privileged position.
A clear distinction must, in any case, be made between oper-
ations conducted under Chapter VI and operations conducted
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Ideally, peace-keeping
operations should be mandated only under Chapter VI of the
U.N. Charter and force should only be authorized in the context
of self-defense. If a liberal interpretation of the use of force for
self-defense is to be made, then it should be the exception rather
than the rule and be limited to broad defensive measures. The
operations should in no circumstances be of an offensive nature
or be disproportionate to the situation at hand. A willingness to
use force in such situations must be clear from the outset and be
equally applied to all parties. It must be sustained and uniformly
exercised by all the diverse U.N. forces in the area. The re-
peated use of force by a peace-keeping operation, however, runs
the risk of becoming a substitute to a search for a viable solution
and, also, to becoming hostage to an uncontrollable escalation
of force. Under such circumstances, the usefulness of the con-
tinuation of a peace-keeping mission will be called into question
and a creeping enforcement role, for which the force is ill-
equipped and ill-prepared, could develop. I believe that, faced
with such circumstances, the United Nations should withdraw its
peace-keeping forces in order to allow a better equipped, better
trained, and better suited force to conduct a peace-enforcement
action.
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By the same token, peace-enforcement operations should
only be mandated under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The
deployment of an operation under Chapter VII should not, how-
ever, exclude the possibility of utilizing, or indeed, encouraging
the use of some elements of peace-keeping operations. In this
way, the errors of attempting to "upgrade" UNPROFOR from a
peace-keeping to a semi-peace-enforcement operation could be
avoided from the outset for future U.N. missions. Troops em-
ployed in peace-enforcement operations should have clear and
precise directives on when and how to use force and be provided
with the proper resources to do so in a proportionate and, if
necessary, escalatory manner. An indiscriminate use of force,
even in a peace-enforcement operation, could result in a force
crossing the line between peace-enforcement and all-out war.
This would undermine any efforts to de-escalate tensions and
could result in a scenario where the operation becomes a part of
the problem rather than a part of the solution.
One of the problems that the international community will
face in pursuing peace-enforcement operations under the aegis
of the United Nations is that the types of forces that will be re-
quired in order to conduct a peace-enfoircement operation can
only be provided by those limited number of Member States that
are able. If such nations, for domestic political reasons, demand
the right to decide where and when their units can be used in
peace-enforcement operations U.N. involvement in such actions
will be severely constrained. The United Nations will eventually
lose credibility and legitimacy in this role.
The presence of UNPROFOR troops in Bosnia and the de-
livery of humanitarian assistance escorted by UNPROFOR troops
has, with the notable but relatively recent exceptions of Srebren-
ica and Zepa, sustained the lives of over two million people.
UNPROFOR, as an arm of the United Nations, cannot and has
not remained morally neutral in the face of ethnic cleansing and
atrocities perpetrated against helpless civilians. The Force has
contributed immensely to the alleviation of human suffering, to
brunting the sharpness of military conflict, and to improving the
safety and welfare of innocent citizens living both in and out of
the safe areas. However, UNPROFOR is a peace-keeping force.
In order to perform its tasks effectively, UNPROFOR has had to
maintain its impartiality, which is based on the consent of the
parties in the conflict. It also has been given an ambitious man-
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date and an ambiguous authorization to use force, about the ex-
tent to which even the Security Council's permanent members
disagree. It is a lightly armed, widely dispersed force, equipped
for peace-keeping, but not for war fighting. Consequently, the
simplistic slogan of a "more robust use of force by UNPROFOR,"
urged by some outside observers as a means to resolve the
problems of Bosnia, was never a viable option for the force that
was sent to Bosnia. Only a force like the one now being assem-
bled by NATO, 60,000 war. fighting soldiers,- is militarily capable
of asserting its will in Bosnia - and that will be on the basis of a
peace agreement signed by all parties, not in the context of ac-
tive hostilities such as the one in which UNPROFOR has had to
operate.
